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Для цитирования

Фауль Б. В. Минимальный дуализм и эпистемический подход // *Омский научный вестник*. Сер. Общество. История. Современность. 2021. Т. 6, № 1. С. 86–90. DOI: 10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-1-86-90.

Статья поступила в редакцию 25.12.2020 г.

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UDC 123.1

DOI: 10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-1-86-90

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MINIMAL DUALISM AND EPISTEMIC APPROACH

In this paper the author presents an argument in favor of minimal dualism — thesis, according to which conscious agents are able to exist without bodies. Author demonstrates the advantages of this argument. Firstly, he shows that this argument is invulnerable to the epistemic strategy of criticizing the conceivability argument. Secondly, the epistemic approach restricts the conceivability of creatures, the possibility of which is incompatible with the minimal dualism.

Keywords: conceivability, possibility, minimal dualism, epistemic strategy, conceivability argument.

Acknowledgments

The reported study is funded by RFBR according to the research project no. 19-011-00604 «Dualism in contemporary philosophy of mind».

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For citations

Faul B. V. Minimal dualism and epistemic approach // *Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity*. 2021. Vol. 6, no. 1. P. 86–90. DOI: 10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-1-86-90.

Received December 25, 2020.

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